The Incentives for Vertical Mergers and Vertical Integration
University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business
University of Maryland - Department of Finance
Gordon M. Phillips
University of Southern California; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
September 26, 2013
We examine the incentives for firms to vertically integrate through vertical mergers and production. We develop a new firm-specific measure of vertical integration using 10-K text to identify the extent a firm's products span vertically related product markets. We find that firms in high R&D industries are less likely to vertically integrate or engage in vertical mergers, and are more likely to initiate customer or supplier relationships outside of the firm. These findings are consistent with firms with unrealized innovation avoiding integration to maintain ex-ante incentives to make relationship specific investments and maintain residual rights of control as in Grossman and Hart (1986). In contrast, firms in high patenting industries with stable product markets are more likely to vertically integrate consistent with control rights being obtained by firms to facilitate commercialization of already realized innovation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 59
Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions, Vertical Mergers, Vertical Integration
JEL Classification: G34working papers series
Date posted: March 31, 2013 ; Last revised: September 27, 2013
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