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Understanding Social Preference with Simple Tests
Gary Charness University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics Matthew Rabin University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics August 2001 Univ. Pompeu Fabra, Economics and Business Working Paper No. 441 Abstract: Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of ?social preferences?. We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments show that subjects are more concerned with increasing social welfare?sacrificing to increase the payoffs for all recipients, especially low-payoff recipients?than with reducing differences in payoffs (as supposed in recent models). Subjects are also motivated by reciprocity: They withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice, and sometimes punish unfair behavior.
Keywords: Difference Aversion, Fairness, Inequity Aversion, Social Welfare, Non-Ultimatum Games, Reciprocal Fairness, Social Preferences, Ultimatum Games. JEL Classifications: A12, A13, B49, C70, C91, D63 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: June 26, 2000 ; Last revised: August 27, 2001Suggested CitationContact Information
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