Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2247599
 
 

Footnotes (133)



 


 



Dynamic Resolution of Large Financial Institutions


Thomas H. Jackson


University of Rochester

David A. Skeel Jr.


University of Pennsylvania Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

2012

2 Harvard Business Law Review 435
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 13-13

Abstract:     
One of the more important issues emerging out of the 2008 financial crisis concerns the proper resolution of a systemically important financial institution. In response to this, Title II of Dodd-Frank created the Orderly Liquidation Authority, or OLA, which is designed to create a resolution framework for systemically important financial institutions that is based on the resolution authority that the FDIC has held over commercial bank failures. In this article, we consider the various alternatives for resolving systemically important institutions. Among these alternatives, we discuss OLA, a European-style bail-in process, and coerced mergers, while also extensively focusing on the bankruptcy code. We argue that implementing several discrete modifications to Dodd-Frank, as well adopting an ambitious Chapter 14 proposal written by a working group at the Hoover Institution is the best way forward for establishing a strong resolution framework.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: Finance, large financial institutions, liquidation, reorganization, administrative resolution, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, regulator-brokered sales, bankruptcy judges, reform

JEL Classification: G2, G21, G28

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: April 12, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Thomas H. and Skeel, David A., Dynamic Resolution of Large Financial Institutions (2012). 2 Harvard Business Law Review 435 ; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 13-13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2247599

Contact Information

Thomas H. Jackson
University of Rochester ( email )
300 Crittenden Blvd.
Rochester, NY 14627
United States
David A. Skeel Jr. (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-573-9859 (Phone)
215-573-2025 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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