Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2248133
 
 

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Mandatory Liability Insurance for Firearm Owners: Design Choices and Second Amendment Limits


Stephen G. Gilles


Quinnipiac University School of Law

Nelson Lund


George Mason University School of Law

April 10, 2013

Engage: The Journal of the Federalist Society’s Practice Groups, Vol. 14, No. 1, February, 2013, pp. 18-24
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-26

Abstract:     
In response to the massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary School, some legislatures are considering proposals to require all gun owners to purchase liability insurance. Although this idea is not without merit, a mandatory insurance regime could easily be designed (either deliberately or inadvertently) in a way that would unnecessarily compromise the Second Amendment rights of individuals. This article provides an analysis that could contribute to designing mandatory liability insurance laws that deserve to be upheld by the courts charged with protecting the constitutional rights of American citizens.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 8

Keywords: accidental, Chicago, competitive pressure, Connecticut, control, D.C. v. Heller, direct government regulation, fourteenth, high-risk, law-abiding, low-risk, McDonald, malicious shootings, misuse, Newtown, possession, public safety, sale, self defense, substantial relationship, tort, Supreme Court

JEL Classification: G22, K13, K14

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Date posted: April 13, 2013 ; Last revised: July 1, 2013

Suggested Citation

Gilles, Stephen G. and Lund, Nelson, Mandatory Liability Insurance for Firearm Owners: Design Choices and Second Amendment Limits (April 10, 2013). Engage: The Journal of the Federalist Society’s Practice Groups, Vol. 14, No. 1, February, 2013, pp. 18-24; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-26. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2248133

Contact Information

Stephen G. Gilles
Quinnipiac University School of Law ( email )
275 Mt. Carmel Ave.
Hamden, CT 06518
United States
203-582-3284 (Phone)
203-582-3244 (Fax)
Nelson Robert Lund (Contact Author)
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-8045 (Phone)
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