Mandatory Liability Insurance for Firearm Owners: Design Choices and Second Amendment Limits
Stephen G. Gilles
Quinnipiac University School of Law
George Mason University School of Law
April 10, 2013
Engage: The Journal of the Federalist Society’s Practice Groups, Vol. 14, No. 1, February, 2013, pp. 18-24
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-26
In response to the massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary School, some legislatures are considering proposals to require all gun owners to purchase liability insurance. Although this idea is not without merit, a mandatory insurance regime could easily be designed (either deliberately or inadvertently) in a way that would unnecessarily compromise the Second Amendment rights of individuals. This article provides an analysis that could contribute to designing mandatory liability insurance laws that deserve to be upheld by the courts charged with protecting the constitutional rights of American citizens.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 8
Keywords: accidental, Chicago, competitive pressure, Connecticut, control, D.C. v. Heller, direct government regulation, fourteenth, high-risk, law-abiding, low-risk, McDonald, malicious shootings, misuse, Newtown, possession, public safety, sale, self defense, substantial relationship, tort, Supreme Court
JEL Classification: G22, K13, K14
Date posted: April 13, 2013 ; Last revised: July 1, 2013
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