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Duality in Property: Commons and Anticommons
Francesco Parisi University of Minnesota - Law School Ben Depoorter University of Miami - School of Law; Ghent University - Department of Legal Theory and Legal History Norbert Schulz University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2005 George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 00-32 Univ. of Virginia Law & Econ Research Paper No. 00-16 Abstract: Commons and Anticommons problems are the consequence of symmetric structural departures from a unified conception of property. In this paper, we endeavor to provide a dual model of property, where commons and anticommons problems are the consequence of a lack of conformity between use and exclusion rights. The general model is then extended to consider the different equilibria obtained under vertical and horizontal cases of property fragmentation. The paper concludes formulating a hypothesis of legal rules for promoting unity in property.
JEL Classifications: K00, K11 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: December 15, 2003 ; Last revised: January 03, 2006Suggested CitationContact Information
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