Duality in Property: Commons and Anticommons
University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna
University of California Hastings College of Law; Ghent University - Center for Advanced Studies in Law & Economics
University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics
International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2005
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 00-32
Univ. of Virginia Law & Econ Research Paper No. 00-16
Commons and Anticommons problems are the consequence of symmetric structural departures from a unified conception of property. In this paper, we endeavor to provide a dual model of property, where commons and anticommons problems are the consequence of a lack of conformity between use and exclusion rights. The general model is then extended to consider the different equilibria obtained under vertical and horizontal cases of property fragmentation. The paper concludes formulating a hypothesis of legal rules for promoting unity in property.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32
JEL Classification: K00, K11Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 15, 2003
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