Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=224844
 
 

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Duality in Property: Commons and Anticommons


Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Ben Depoorter


University of California Hastings College of Law; Ugent - CASLE; Stanford CIS

Norbert Schulz


University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics


International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2005
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 00-32
Univ. of Virginia Law & Econ Research Paper No. 00-16

Abstract:     
Commons and Anticommons problems are the consequence of symmetric structural departures from a unified conception of property. In this paper, we endeavor to provide a dual model of property, where commons and anticommons problems are the consequence of a lack of conformity between use and exclusion rights. The general model is then extended to consider the different equilibria obtained under vertical and horizontal cases of property fragmentation. The paper concludes formulating a hypothesis of legal rules for promoting unity in property.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

JEL Classification: K00, K11


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Date posted: December 15, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Parisi, Francesco and Depoorter, Ben and Schulz, Norbert, Duality in Property: Commons and Anticommons. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2005; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 00-32; Univ. of Virginia Law & Econ Research Paper No. 00-16. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=224844 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.224844

Contact Information

Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Ben Depoorter (Contact Author)
University of California Hastings College of Law ( email )
200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

Ugent - CASLE ( email )
Universiteitstraat 4
Belgium
Stanford CIS ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Norbert Schulz
University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics ( email )
Sanderring 2
Lehrstuhl VWL III
D-97070 Wuerzburg
Germany
+49-931/31 29 60 (Phone)
+49-931/31 26 21 (Fax)
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