Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2248667
 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



How Norms Can Generate Conflict: An Experiment on the Failure of Cooperative Micro-Motives on the Macro-Level


Fabian Winter


Max Planck Institute of Economics

Heiko Rauhut


ETH Zürich

Dirk Helbing


ETH Zürich - Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences (GESS); ETH Zürich

April 11, 2013

Social Forces 90 (3), 919-946, March 2012

Abstract:     
Why does the adherence to norms not prevent conflict? While the current literature focuses on the emergence, maintenance and impact of norms with regard to cooperation, the issue of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a general game theoretical model of “normative conflict” and explain how transaction failures on the macrolevel can result from cooperative motives on the microlevel. We differentiate between two kinds of conflict. The first results from distinct expectations regarding the way in which general normative obligations should be fulfilled, the second from distinct expectations as to how the norm should restrain actions based on self-interest. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of normative conflict in a version of the ultimatum game. Our data reveal widespread normative conflict among different types of actors – egoistic, equity, equality and cherry picker. Our findings demonstrate how cooperative intentions about how to divide a collectively produced good may fail to produce cooperative outcomes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

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Date posted: April 13, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Winter, Fabian and Rauhut, Heiko and Helbing, Dirk, How Norms Can Generate Conflict: An Experiment on the Failure of Cooperative Micro-Motives on the Macro-Level (April 11, 2013). Social Forces 90 (3), 919-946, March 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2248667

Contact Information

Fabian Winter (Contact Author)
Max Planck Institute of Economics ( email )
Kahlaische Str. 10
Jena, 07743
Germany
Heiko Rauhut
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich ( email )
Zürichbergstrasse 18
8092 Zurich, CH-1015
Switzerland
Dirk Helbing
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich - Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences (GESS) ( email )
ETH-Zentrum SEW E 26
CH-8092 Zurich
Switzerland
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich ( email )
Zürichbergstrasse 18
8092 Zurich, CH-1015
Switzerland
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