Abstract

 
 

Citations (41)



 


 



Why is There Multilateral Lending?


Dani Rodrik


Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

June 1995

NBER Working Paper No. w5160

Abstract:     
Why should multilateral lending exist in a world where private capital markets are well developed and governments have their own bilateral aid programs? If lending by the World Bank, IMF, and regional development banks has an independent rationale, it must rest on advantages generated by the multilateral nature of these institutions. There are in principle two such advantages. First, since information on the quality of investment environments in different countries is in many ways a collective good, multilateral agencies are in a better position to internalize the externalities that may arise. This creates a rationale for multilateral lending in terms of information provision, particularly in terms of monitoring of government policies in recipient countries. Second, as long as multilateral agencies retain some degree of autonomy from the governments that own them, their interaction with recipient countries, while official in nature, can remain less politicized than inter- governmental links. This in turn endows multilateral agencies with an advantage in the exercise of conditionality, (that is, in lending that is conditional on changes in government policies). Neither of these two potential advantages of multilateral lending has much to do with lending per se. However, multilateral lending may be required to make these agencies' tasks incentive compatible. The empirical analysis reveals little evidence that multilateral lending has acted as a catalyst for private capital flows.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: June 10, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Rodrik, Dani, Why is There Multilateral Lending? (June 1995). NBER Working Paper No. w5160. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=225224

Contact Information

Dani Rodrik (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-9454 (Phone)
617-496-5747 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/rodrik/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,243
Downloads: 71
Download Rank: 167,859
Citations:  41

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.438 seconds