Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2253809
 
 

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Impossibility of the Existence of Opposite Equilibrium Preferences on Law Enforcement


Hakan Inal


Izmir University

April 19, 2013


Abstract:     
Law enforcement is among the key elements of a civil society that ensures the achievement of a higher social welfare. An enforcement authority determines the level of public enforcement of law. In this paper, I show that in a standard model of law enforcement in the literature, it is impossible to have agents with “opposite equilibrium preferences” over the level of public enforcement of law in the same society.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 8

Keywords: Public enforcement, Equilibrium preferences, Enforcement equilibrium, Single-peaked preferences, Social choice

JEL Classification: D62, D7, K14, K42

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Date posted: April 19, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Inal, Hakan, Impossibility of the Existence of Opposite Equilibrium Preferences on Law Enforcement (April 19, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2253809 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2253809

Contact Information

Hakan Inal (Contact Author)
Izmir University ( email )
Gursel Aksel Bulvari No:14 Uckuyular
Izmir, 35350
Turkey
HOME PAGE: http://www.izmir.edu.tr
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References:  8

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