Impossibility of the Existence of Opposite Equilibrium Preferences on Law Enforcement
April 19, 2013
Law enforcement is among the key elements of a civil society that ensures the achievement of a higher social welfare. An enforcement authority determines the level of public enforcement of law. In this paper, I show that in a standard model of law enforcement in the literature, it is impossible to have agents with “opposite equilibrium preferences” over the level of public enforcement of law in the same society.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 8
Keywords: Public enforcement, Equilibrium preferences, Enforcement equilibrium, Single-peaked preferences, Social choice
JEL Classification: D62, D7, K14, K42working papers series
Date posted: April 19, 2013
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