Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=225567
 
 

References (26)



 
 

Citations (21)



 
 

Footnotes (27)



 


 



The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution


Theodore Eisenberg


Cornell University - Law School

Henry S. Farber


Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

July 1996

NBER Working Paper No. w5649

Abstract:     
A central feature of the litigation process that affects case outcomes is the selection of cases for litigation. In this study, we present a theoretical framework for understanding the operation of this suit selection process and its relationship to the underlying distribution of potential claims and claimants. We implement the model empirically by assuming that individuals vary more in their litigiousness (inverse costs of litigation) than do corporations. This assumption, coupled with the case selection process we present, yields clear predictions on trial rates as a function of whether the plaintiff and defendant were individuals or corporations. The model also yields a prediction on the plaintiff's win rate in lawsuits as a function of the plaintiff's identity. Our empirical analysis, using data on over 200,000 federal civil litigations, yields results that are generally consistent with the theory. Lawsuits where the plaintiff is an individual are found to have higher trial rates and lower plaintiff win rates.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

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Date posted: June 14, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Eisenberg, Theodore and Farber, Henry S., The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution (July 1996). NBER Working Paper No. w5649. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=225567

Contact Information

Theodore Eisenberg (Contact Author)
Cornell University - Law School ( email )
524 College Ave
Myron Taylor Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-6477 (Phone)
607-255-7193 (Fax)
Henry S. Farber
Princeton University ( email )
Industrial Relations Section
Firestone Library
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States
609-258-4044 (Phone)
609-258-2907 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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References:  26
Citations:  21
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