Credit Cycles

63 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2000 Last revised: 23 Nov 2022

See all articles by Nobuhiro Kiyotaki

Nobuhiro Kiyotaki

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

John Moore

University of Edinburgh - Economics; London School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 1995

Abstract

This paper is a theoretical study into how credit constraints interact with aggregate economic activity over the business cycle. We construct a model of a dynamic economy in which lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debts unless the debts are secured. In such an economy, durable assets such as land, buildings and machinery play a dual role: they are not only factors of production, but they also serve as collateral for loans. Borrowers' credit limits are affected by the prices of the collateralized assets. And at the same time, these prices are affected by the size of the credit limits. The dynamic interaction between credit limits and asset prices turns out to be a powerful transmission mechanism by which the effects of shocks persist, amplify, and spill over to other sectors. We show that small, temporary shocks to technology or income distribution can generate large, persistent fluctuations in output and asset prices.

Suggested Citation

Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Moore, John Hardman, Credit Cycles (April 1995). NBER Working Paper No. w5083, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=225861

Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

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John Hardman Moore

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