|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Implicit Contracts and the Theory of the FirmGeorge P. BakerHBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Robert S. GibbonsMassachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School and Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Kevin J. MurphyUniversity of Southern California - Marshall School of Business; University of Southern California - Department of Economics; USC Gould School of Law September 1997 NBER Working Paper No. w6177 Abstract: We analyze the role of implicit contracts' (that is, informal agreements supported by" reputation rather than law) both within firms, for example in employment relationships between them, for example as hand-in-glove supplier relationships. We find that the optimal" organizational form is determined largely by what implicit contracts it facilitates. Among other" things, we also show that vertical integration is an efficient response to widely varying supply" prices. Finally, our model suggests why management' (that is, the development and" implementation of unwritten rules and codes of conduct) is essential in organizations. "
Number of Pages in PDF File: 41 working papers seriesDate posted: August 30, 2000Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.422 seconds
