Drawing Sensible Borders for the Definition of 'Foreign Official' Under the FCPA
Alexander G. Hughes
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
May 3, 2013
American Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2013
This note analyzes recent developments surrounding the definition of 'foreign official' under the FCPA and proposes a bright-line test for assessing whether an entity qualifies as an 'instrumentality' of a foreign government, thereby rendering its employees foreign officials under the terms of the statute.
The FCPA has been one of the key points of emphasis for enforcement actions by both the SEC and DOJ over the past few years, with the top-10 highest dollar value penalties in the FCPA’s history all being handed down since 2008. Compliance costs for companies have gone up considerably due to this increased emphasis, combined with the uncertainty the statute’s language engenders. This note provides an easily workable test that will eliminate this uncertainty and will promote greater consistency and predictability in the FCPA’s application. This predictability will be especially pronounced in regards to the FCPA's application to partially state-owned enterprises and will allow multinational corporations to do business abroad without worrying about unwittingly violating the FCPA.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27
Keywords: FCPA, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC enforcement, DOJ enforcement, bribery, foreign, foreign official, instrumentality
JEL Classification: K20, K22, K42, K49, H87, F10, F52, F60, F63, F68, F69Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 1, 2013
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