Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260604
 
 

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Informal Budgeting Mechanisms and the Expenditure Response to Revenue Sharing Transfers: Evidence from the State of Baja California, Mexico


Salvador Espinosa


San Diego State University - School of Public Affairs; Indiana University - The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis

May 1, 2013

Gestión y Política Pública, 2014

Abstract:     
This article contributes to ongoing discussions about the organization of Mexico's fiscal federal system and the incentives on state governments that it creates. New empirical evidence suggests that revenue sharing transfers (participaciones) in Mexico have an asymmetric impact on state government expenditures outcomes. It is argued in this article that such asymmetries are due in part to informal decision-making mechanisms that influence intergovernmental budget negotiations and may place some entities in a advantageous position to access extra-budgetary funds. This research uses the Mexican state of Baja California as a case study to understand the way in which unofficial agreements could be affecting the expenditure response to revenue sharing transfers. The analysis allows one to generate hypotheses about features of the intergovernmental system that existing studies have not considered, and which may affect the sustainability of Mexico’s intergovernmental fiscal pact.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: Federalism, Budget politics, budget process, intergovernmental relations, federal transfers, Mexico

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Date posted: May 5, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Espinosa, Salvador, Informal Budgeting Mechanisms and the Expenditure Response to Revenue Sharing Transfers: Evidence from the State of Baja California, Mexico (May 1, 2013). Gestión y Política Pública, 2014. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260604

Contact Information

Salvador Espinosa (Contact Author)
San Diego State University - School of Public Affairs ( email )
5500 Campanile Drive
San Diego, CA 92182-4505
United States
(619)594-5880 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.salvadorespinosa.com
Indiana University - The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis ( email )
Indiana University Bloomington
IN
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.iub.edu/~workshop
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