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http://ssrn.com/abstract=226117
 
 

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The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment


Raghuram G. Rajan


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; International Monetary Fund (IMF); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Henri Servaes


London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Luigi Zingales


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

January 1998

NBER Working Paper No. w6368

Abstract:     
In a simple model of capital budgeting in a diversified firm where headquarters has limited power, we show that funds are allocated towards the most inefficient divisions. The distortion is greater the more diverse are the investment opportunities of the firm's divisions. We test these implications on a panel of diversified firms in the U.S. during the period 1979-1993. We find that i) diversified firms mis-allocate investment funds; ii) the extent of mis-allocation is positively related to the diversity of the investment opportunities across divisions; iii) the discount at which these diversified firms trade is positively related to the extent of the investment mis-allocation and to the diversity of the investment opportunities across divisions.

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Date posted: May 25, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Rajan, Raghuram G. and Servaes, Henri and Zingales, Luigi, The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment (January 1998). NBER Working Paper No. w6368. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=226117

Contact Information

Raghuram G. Rajan (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-4437 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
773-702-9299 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
Henri Servaes
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7000 8268 (Phone)
+44 20 7000 8201 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.london.edu/hservaes/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Luigi Zingales
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-3196 (Phone)
773-834-2081 (Fax)

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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