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Staggered Price Setting and Endogenous Persistence


Paul R. Bergin


University of California, Davis - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Robert C. Feenstra


University of California, Davis - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

April 1998

NBER Working Paper No. w6492

Abstract:     
This paper generates persistent effects of a monetary disturbance in the context of staggered price-setters. Previous research has been restricted by the CES functional form to price-setting rules that are constant markups over marginal costs. The present paper considers a translog form for preferences and an input-output structure for production in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model of monopolistically competitive staggered price-setters. We derive a price-setting rule that is a function of marginal cost and also competitors' prices. This rule better captures the interaction of price-setters envisioned in Taylor (1980) and Blanchard (1983) in their early work on staggered contracts. The model is able to generate reasonable persistence, and also confirms the conjecture of Taylor and Blanchard that increasing the number of contracting groups increases the degree of persistence.

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Date posted: July 10, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Bergin, Paul R. and Feenstra, Robert C., Staggered Price Setting and Endogenous Persistence (April 1998). NBER Working Paper No. w6492. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=226237

Contact Information

Paul R. Bergin (Contact Author)
University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )
One Shields Drive
1141 Social Sciences & Humanities Bldg.
Davis, CA 95616-8578
United States
530-752-8398 (Phone)
530-752-9382 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Robert C. Feenstra
University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )
One Shields Drive
Davis, CA 95616-8578
United States
916-752-9240 (Phone)
916-752-9382 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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