Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting
World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)
World Bank; World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)
May 1, 2013
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6442
This paper explores the empirical relationship between bank competition, bank concentration, and the emergence of credit reporting institutions. The authors find that countries with lower entry barriers into the banking market (that is, a greater threat of competition) are less likely to have a credit bureau, presumably because banks are less willing to share proprietary information when the threat of market entry is high. In addition, a credit bureau is significantly less likely to emerge in economies characterized by a high degree of bank concentration. The authors argue that the reason for this finding is that large banks stand to lose more monopoly rents from sharing their extensive information with smaller players. In contrast, the data show no significant relationship between bank competition or concentration and the emergence of a public credit registry, where banks' participation is mandatory. The results highlight that policies designed to promote the voluntary creation of a credit bureau need to take into account banks' incentives to extract monopoly rents from proprietary credit information.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35
Keywords: Access to Finance, Banks & Banking Reform, Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress, Debt Markets, Economic Theory & Researchworking papers series
Date posted: May 14, 2013
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.625 seconds