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The Causes and Effects of Liability Reform: Some Empirical Evidence
Thomas J. Campbell affiliation not provided to SSRN Daniel P. Kessler Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) George B. Shepherd Emory University School of Law January 1995 NBER Working Paper No. W4989 Abstract: We provide empirical evidence both on the causes and the effects of liability reforms. Using a newly collected data set of state tort laws and a panel data set containing industry-level data by state for the years 1969-1990, we (1) identify the characteristics of states that are associated with liability reforms and (2) examine whether liability reforms influence productivity and employment. We present two central findings. First, reductions in liability levels are associated with increases in measured productivity and employment in most industries that we studied. Second, liability reforms that reduce legal liability are generally positively correlated with measures of political conservatism. Working Paper Series Date posted: June 27, 2000 ; Last revised: April 22, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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