Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=226587
 
 

References (28)



 
 

Citations (3)



 
 

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The Causes and Effects of Liability Reform: Some Empirical Evidence


Thomas J. Campbell


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Daniel P. Kessler


Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

George B. Shepherd


Emory University School of Law

January 1995

NBER Working Paper No. w4989

Abstract:     
We provide empirical evidence both on the causes and the effects of liability reforms. Using a newly collected data set of state tort laws and a panel data set containing industry-level data by state for the years 1969-1990, we (1) identify the characteristics of states that are associated with liability reforms and (2) examine whether liability reforms influence productivity and employment. We present two central findings. First, reductions in liability levels are associated with increases in measured productivity and employment in most industries that we studied. Second, liability reforms that reduce legal liability are generally positively correlated with measures of political conservatism.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

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Date posted: June 27, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Campbell, Thomas J. and Kessler, Daniel P. and Shepherd, George B., The Causes and Effects of Liability Reform: Some Empirical Evidence (January 1995). NBER Working Paper No. w4989. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=226587

Contact Information

Thomas J. Campbell
affiliation not provided to SSRN
No Address Available
Daniel Philip Kessler (Contact Author)
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-4492 (Phone)
650-725-6152 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
George B. Shepherd
Emory University School of Law ( email )
1301 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-727-6978 (Phone)
404-727-6820 (Fax)
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References:  28
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