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Government Intervention in the Markets for Education and Health Care: How and Why?


James M. Poterba


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

December 1995

NBER Working Paper No. w4916

Abstract:     
Education and health care are the two largest government expenditure items in the United States. The public sector directly provides the majority of educational services, through the public school bureaucracy, while most public support for health care is channelled through a system of tax-supported government payments for services provided by private providers. The contrast between public policies in these markets raises a host of questions about the scope of government in a mixed economy, and the structure of policies for market intervention. This paper examines how two standard arguments for government intervention in private markets, market failure and redistribution, apply to the markets for education and medical care. It then considers the 'choice of instrument' problem, the choice between intervention via price subsidies, mandates, and direct public provision of services in these markets. Economic arguments alone seem unable to explain the sharp divergence between the nature of public policies with respect to education and medical care. Moreover, there is virtually no evidence on the empirical magnitudes of many of the key parameters needed to guide policy in these areas, such as the social externalities associated with primary and secondary education or the degree to which adverse selection in the insurance market prevents private insurance purchase.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

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Date posted: September 22, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Poterba, James M., Government Intervention in the Markets for Education and Health Care: How and Why? (December 1995). NBER Working Paper No. w4916. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=226608

Contact Information

James M. Poterba (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )
50 Memorial Drive
E52-350
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-6673 (Phone)
617-253-1330 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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