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http://ssrn.com/abstract=226799
 
 

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Political Instability and Economic Growth


Alberto F. Alesina


Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Sule Ozler


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Nouriel Roubini


New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Phillip Swagel


Northwestern University - Department of Economics; International Monetary Fund (IMF)

September 1992

NBER Working Paper No. w4173

Abstract:     
This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950-1982. We define ?political instability? as the propensity of a government collapse, and we estimate a model in which political instability and economic growth are jointly determined. The main result of this paper is that in countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. This effect remains strong when we restrict our definition of ?government change? to cases of substantial changes of the government.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

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Date posted: September 14, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Ozler, Sule and Roubini, Nouriel and Swagel, Phillip, Political Instability and Economic Growth (September 1992). NBER Working Paper No. w4173. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=226799

Contact Information

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-8388 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Sule Ozler
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics ( email )
Box 951477
Bunche Hall 9361
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
United States
(310) 206-6031 (Phone)
(310) 825-9528 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Nouriel Roubini
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )
269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-998-0886 (Phone)
212-995-4218 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Phillip Swagel
Northwestern University - Department of Economics ( email )
2003 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
(847) 491-8219 (Phone)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
IMF Room 10-612F
Washington, DC 20431
United States
(202) 623-7301 (Phone)
(202) 623-6343 (Fax)
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