Political Instability and Economic Growth
Alberto F. Alesina
Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Northwestern University - Department of Economics; International Monetary Fund (IMF)
NBER Working Paper No. w4173
This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950-1982. We define ?political instability? as the propensity of a government collapse, and we estimate a model in which political instability and economic growth are jointly determined. The main result of this paper is that in countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. This effect remains strong when we restrict our definition of ?government change? to cases of substantial changes of the government.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 49working papers series
Date posted: September 14, 2000
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.422 seconds