|
||||
|
||||
Hysteresis and the European Unemployment ProblemOlivier J. BlanchardMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); International Monetary Fund (IMF) Lawrence H. SummersHarvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 1987 NBER Working Paper No. w1950 Abstract: European unemployment has been steadily increasing for the last 15 years and isexpected to remain very high for many years to come. In this paper, we argue thatthis fact implies that shocks have much more persistent effects on unemployment thanstandard theories can possibly explain. We develop a theory which can explain suchpersistence, and which is based on the distinction between insiders and outsiders inwage bargaining. We argue that if wages are largely set by bargaining betweeninsiders and firms, shocks which affect actual unemployment tend also to affectequilibrium unemployment. We then confront the theory to both the detailed facts ofthe European situation as well as to earlier periods of high persistent unemploymentsuch as the Great Depression in the US.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 100 working papers seriesDate posted: May 26, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.594 seconds