Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence

53 Pages Posted: 30 May 2013 Last revised: 22 Jul 2014

See all articles by Anke Gerber

Anke Gerber

Universität Hamburg

Andreas Nicklisch

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 21, 2014

Abstract

We provide theoretical conjectures about and experimental evidence on the emergence of redistributive societies. Individuals first vote on a distribution rule with their feet and then invest and redistribute total income according to the chosen rule. We vary the individuals’ information about their productivity at the time they choose a distribution rule and find that there is more redistribution behind a veil of ignorance than in the glare of full information. However, the scope of redistribution is less sensitive to the degree of uncertainty than predicted by a model of selfish and rational expected utility maximizers. For all degrees of uncertainty, we find a coexistence of libertarianism and redistribution as well as imperfect segregation, so that heterogeneous redistribution communities turn out to be sustainable.

Keywords: Constitutional Choice, Experimental Economics, Redistribution, Veil of Ignorance, Voting by Feet

JEL Classification: C91, D02, D63, H24, K00

Suggested Citation

Gerber, Anke and Nicklisch, Andreas and Voigt, Stefan, Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence (July 21, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2271349 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2271349

Anke Gerber (Contact Author)

Universität Hamburg ( email )

Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

Andreas Nicklisch

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, D-20354
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
49 228 9141679 (Phone)
49 228 9141655 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/nicklisch.html

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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