Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2271587
 


 



Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure


Iman Anabtawi


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Steven L. Schwarcz


Duke University - School of Law

November 18, 2013

92 Texas Law Review 75 (2013)
UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 13-07

Abstract:     
Unlike many other areas of regulation, financial regulation operates in the context of a complex interdependent system. The interconnections among firms, markets, and legal rules have implications for financial regulatory policy, especially the choice between ex ante regulation aimed at preventing financial failure and ex post regulation aimed at responding to that failure. Regulatory theory has paid relatively little attention to this distinction. Were regulation to consist solely of duty-imposing norms, such neglect might be defensible. In the context of a system, however, regulation can also take the form of interventions aimed at mitigating the potentially systemic consequences of a financial failure. We show that this dual role of financial regulation implies that ex ante regulation and ex post regulation should be balanced in setting financial regulatory policy, and we offer guidelines for achieving that balance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 57

Keywords: financial regulation, systemic risk, ex ante regulation, ex post regulation, Dodd Frank

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Date posted: May 30, 2013 ; Last revised: November 20, 2013

Suggested Citation

Anabtawi, Iman and Schwarcz, Steven L., Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure (November 18, 2013). 92 Texas Law Review 75 (2013); UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 13-07. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2271587

Contact Information

Iman Anabtawi
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
Steven L. Schwarcz (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7060 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)
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