Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2272665
 


 



Sovereignty, Integration and Tax Avoidance in the European Union: Striking the Proper Balance


Lilian V. Faulhaber


Boston University - School of Law

May 31, 2013

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 48, pp. 177-241 (2010)
Boston Univ. School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 10-46

Abstract:     
As the need to raise revenue becomes more pressing and public opposition to tax avoidance increases, the European Court of Justice has made it more difficult for the twenty-seven Member States of the European Union to prevent tax avoidance and shape fiscal policy. This article introduces the new anti-avoidance doctrine of the European Court of Justice and analyzes it from the perspective of taxpayers, Member States and the European Union legal order as a whole. This doctrine is problematic becasue it has created a legislative vacuum in Europe. No European Union institution has the authority to regulate direct taxation without the unanimous support of all twenty-seven Member States. As the European Court of Justice strikes down Member State efforts to prevent tax avoidance, no institution can step in to replace these Member State provisions. Member States are thus losing sovereignty over policy tax avoidance, but no legislative move toward an integrated approach is possible without the support of Member States. This article proposes several solutions to the problems posed by the doctrine.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 66

Keywords: tax, international tax, international law, European Union law, public policy, tax avoidance, wholly artificial arrangments

JEL Classification: K33, K34

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: May 31, 2013 ; Last revised: June 11, 2013

Suggested Citation

Faulhaber, Lilian V., Sovereignty, Integration and Tax Avoidance in the European Union: Striking the Proper Balance (May 31, 2013). Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 48, pp. 177-241 (2010); Boston Univ. School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 10-46. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2272665

Contact Information

Lilian V. Faulhaber (Contact Author)
Boston University - School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 254
Downloads: 49

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.406 seconds