Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 - A Retrospective

published in Journal of European Competition Law and Practice, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2013, pp. 293-301

presentation at the conference '10 Years of Regulation 1/2003' (Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation, 7 June 2013);

18 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2013 Last revised: 5 Sep 2019

See all articles by Wouter P. J. Wils

Wouter P. J. Wils

King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law; European Union - European Commission

Date Written: June 4, 2013

Abstract

Regulation 1/2003 brought about a radical change in the way in which the EU antitrust prohibitions contained in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are enforced. The previous enforcement regime, under Regulation 17, which dated from 1962, was characterised by a centralised notification and authorisation system for Article 101(3) TFEU. Regulation 1/2003 abolished this system and replaced it by a system of decentralised ex post enforcement, in which the European Commission and the competition authorities of the EU Member States (national competition authorities), forming together the European Competition Network, pursue infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.

This paper provides a brief reminder of the genesis of Regulation 1/2003, and a short overview of its main results, as apparent ten years later.

Keywords: antitrust enforcement, European Union

JEL Classification: K21, K40, K42, L40

Suggested Citation

Wils, Wouter P. J., Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 - A Retrospective (June 4, 2013). published in Journal of European Competition Law and Practice, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2013, pp. 293-301, presentation at the conference '10 Years of Regulation 1/2003' (Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation, 7 June 2013); , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2274013

Wouter P. J. Wils (Contact Author)

King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law

Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

European Union - European Commission ( email )

Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

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