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Speculative Attack and the External Constraint in a Maximizing Model of the Balance of Payments


Maurice Obstfeld


University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

July 1986

NBER Working Paper No. w1437

Abstract:     
This paper analyzes inevitable transitions between fixed and floating exchange-rate regimes in a balance-of-payments model where individual preferences are explicitly specified. The goal is to assessthe analogy between speculative attacks in foreign exchange markets and attacks on official price-fixing schemes in natural resource markets. In discrete time the analogy with resource markets is only partially correct, for in a deterministic model the collapse of a fixed rate may be characterized by two, successive attacks. The two-attack equilibriumis peculiar to discrete-time analysis, however. In the continuous-time limit of discrete-time models there is a single attack timed so as to rule out an anticipated discrete jump in the exchange rate.Balance-of-payments models differ from nonrenewable resource models in that foreign exchange reserves may be borrowed from abroad.The paper therefore asks whether there are limits to central-bank borrowing possibilities. In an idealized world where all private incomeis subject to lump-sum taxation, central-bank reserves can become infinitely negative with no violation of the public sector's intertemporal budget constraint. Nonetheless, a growth rate of domestic credit exceeding the world interest rate, if maintained indefinitely, leads to violation of the constraint in the paper's model.

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Date posted: July 4, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Obstfeld, Maurice, Speculative Attack and the External Constraint in a Maximizing Model of the Balance of Payments (July 1986). NBER Working Paper No. w1437. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=227486

Contact Information

Maurice Obstfeld (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
510-643-9646 (Phone)
510-642-6615 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/obstfeld/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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