The Economics of Class Actions and Class Action Waivers
Keith N. Hylton
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
July 1, 2013
Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 13-22
Class action litigation has generated a series of recent Supreme Court decisions imposing greater federal court supervision over the prosecution of collective injury claims. This group of cases raises the question whether class action waivers should be permitted on policy grounds. I examine the economics of class actions and waivers in this paper. I distinguish between the standard one-on-one litigation environment and the class action environment. In the standard environment, waivers between informed agents enhance society’s welfare. In the class action environment, in contrast, not all waivers are likely to enhance society’s welfare.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35
Keywords: class action, class action waivers, economics of class actions, economics of class action waivers
JEL Classification: K00, K13, K49working papers series
Date posted: June 11, 2013 ; Last revised: December 18, 2013
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