Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2278037
 


 



The Prodigal Corporation: An Analysis on the Effectiveness of the ACCC's Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct


Anthony Gray


University of Sydney

Andrew Wait


University of Sydney

Bonnie Nguyen


University of Sydney

March 2013

Australian Economic Papers, Vol. 52, Issue 1, pp. 38-51, 2013

Abstract:     
We examine the impact of the ACCC's leniency policy (Immunity Policy) on cartel stability. The policy, by reducing the fines of the first cartel members who cooperate with competition authorities, can act to deter collusion. However, we find that care is needed in how a leniency policy is implemented. It is possible that the leniency policy can make collusion easier to sustain than in its absence. Further, the ACCC's Cooperation Policy, which applies to all parties who assist the Commission with an investigation, can act to undermine the effectiveness of the leniency policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

Accepted Paper Series





Date posted: June 12, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Gray, Anthony and Wait, Andrew and Nguyen, Bonnie, The Prodigal Corporation: An Analysis on the Effectiveness of the ACCC's Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct (March 2013). Australian Economic Papers, Vol. 52, Issue 1, pp. 38-51, 2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2278037 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8454.12006

Contact Information

Anthony Gray
University of Sydney ( email )
University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia
Andrew Wait
University of Sydney ( email )
School of Economics
University of Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia
+61-2-9351-3060 (Phone)
+61-2-9351-4341 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://sydney.edu.au/arts/economics/
Bonnie Nguyen
University of Sydney ( email )
University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia
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