Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2278113
 


 



How Do Incumbents Respond to Low-End Firm Entry?


Ajay Bhaskarabhatla


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE); Erasmus Research Institute of Management

Chirantan Chatterjee


Indian Institute of Management (IIMB), Bangalore

February 3, 2015

IIM Bangalore Research Paper No. 410

Abstract:     
This article investigates how incumbents respond to low-end firm entry. Prior theory suggests that high-end incumbents raise their price in response to a profit-maximizing low-cost entrant but lower their price in response to a welfare-maximizing low-end entrant. This paper uses a dataset of 206 narrowly-defined pharmaceutical markets in India; proposes a method to identify welfare-maximizing low-end firms; identifies such a firm with a mission defined more broadly than profit maximization; and presents evidence of a decline in high-end prices and dosage sizes offered by incumbents due to anticipated and actual low-end firm entry. Next, the paper examines the reasons for the low-end firm’s success by testing for observable differences in its business model relative to that of the incumbents, arising from the underlying differences in the objective functions of firms. Understanding market competition among firms with differing motives is especially important in light of 1) the growing view that shareholder value maximization alone may be unsustainable in the long term; and 2) the growing number of low-end entrepreneurial experiments across several countries and industries to serve consumers with limited purchasing power profitably.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: entry, mixed markets, low-end firms, pharmaceuticals, India


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Date posted: June 13, 2013 ; Last revised: February 4, 2015

Suggested Citation

Bhaskarabhatla, Ajay and Chatterjee, Chirantan, How Do Incumbents Respond to Low-End Firm Entry? (February 3, 2015). IIM Bangalore Research Paper No. 410. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2278113 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2278113

Contact Information

Ajay Bhaskarabhatla (Contact Author)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands
+31 10 408 1004 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl/bhaskarabhatla/
Erasmus Research Institute of Management ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 10 408 1004 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.erim.eur.nl/people/ajay-bhaskarabhatla/
Chirantan Chatterjee
Indian Institute of Management (IIMB), Bangalore ( email )
Bannerghatta Road
Bangalore, Karnataka 560076
India
08026993141 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.iimb.ernet.in/user/185/chirantan-chatterjee

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