Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2278839
 


 



Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law - A Differentiated Approach


Kai Hüschelrath


Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Sebastian Peyer


University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy

2013

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 29

Abstract:     
We investigate the relationship between public and private enforcers introducing a more differentiated approach. In contrast to the existing literature, we take into account that the costs and benefits of detection and prosecution and, thus, the usefulness of each enforcement mode may change with a variation of the type of anticompetitive conduct.

We define a set of parameters that determine the costs and benefits of both types to enforce the antitrust laws and discuss implications for European competition law and policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: competition policy, public enforcement, private enforcement, European Union

JEL Classification: K21, L40

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Date posted: June 14, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Hüschelrath, Kai and Peyer, Sebastian, Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law - A Differentiated Approach (2013). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 29. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2278839 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2278839

Contact Information

Kai Hüschelrath (Contact Author)
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )
P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany
Sebastian Peyer
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )
UEA
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ
United Kingdom
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