Against Being Against the Revolving Door
David T. Zaring
University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department
June 13, 2013
University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2013, No. 2, 2013
The revolving door between jobs in the public and private sector supposedly incentivizes government regulators to regulate on behalf of the industry interests for whom they will eventually work. It is a critical building block of the critique of government solutions to modern problems, and has, in the last two years, been the subject of one of the Obama administration’s first executive orders, made an appearance in financial regulatory reform legislation, and been blamed for the government’s failure to prevent the Gulf oil spill.
But the revolving door’s explanatory power is remarkably overstated, especially when the subject is law enforcement. Most government officials have plenty of reasons to do a good job, and sometimes a successful stint in the public sector enhances private sector earning potential, to say nothing of more immediate civil service prospects. The revolving door may also foster citizen participation in government. A study of the careers of a tranche of elite Manhattan prosecutors does not reveal any evidence of those who leave doing the bidding of those they regulate while in public service.
Moreover, as a legal matter, eliminating the revolving door would raise serious legal and even constitutional questions. The revolving door has become an overused shorthand for – at its worst – a toxic cynicism about government. It is time to deeply qualify the critique.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 44Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: June 15, 2013 ; Last revised: June 19, 2013
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