Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2280003
 


 



China and Cambodia: Patron and Client?


John D. Ciorciari


University of Michigan - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy

June 14, 2013

International Policy Center Working Paper No. 121

Abstract:     
In recent years, Cambodia has become one of China's closest international partners and diplomatic allies. Cambodia's apparent defense of China during ASEAN talks on the South China Sea demonstrated the strength of the partnership and its relevance to broader regional relations. This paper examines key trends in the relationship and argues that it conforms increasingly to a patron-client arrangement. Such arrangements are rooted in an exchange of benefits. Among other things, patronage buys the stronger state a degree of deference and political support from its weaker partner, while client status entitles the weaker party to aid and protection at some cost in policy autonomy. This paper argues that Sino-Cambodian ties have become close over the past fifteen years largely because China has offered Cambodia's governing elites a favorable bargain, providing ample economic and political benefits without demanding particularly costly forms of political support in return. That has begun to change, however. Cambodia's governing elites have become more dependent on China, more beholden to Beijing's policy preferences, and more closely identified with China by critics at home and abroad. Cambodia is thus beginning to experience more of the risks inherent in any patron-client pact, suggesting an imbalance in its foreign relations that augurs poorly for the future if current trends continue.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: China, Cambodia, patron-client, alliance, international relations, Southeast Asia

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Date posted: June 17, 2013 ; Last revised: June 27, 2013

Suggested Citation

Ciorciari, John D., China and Cambodia: Patron and Client? (June 14, 2013). International Policy Center Working Paper No. 121. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2280003 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2280003

Contact Information

John David Ciorciari (Contact Author)
University of Michigan - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy ( email )
701 Tappan St. Rm E2600
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
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