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Incentive Contracts


Edward P. Lazear


Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
May 1986

NBER Working Paper No. w1917

Abstract:     
Labor relations involve incentive problems. The market solves these problems by developing a variety of institutions. This paper describes and assesses the various forms of incentive contracts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

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Date posted: August 20, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Lazear, Edward P., Incentive Contracts (May 1986). NBER Working Paper No. w1917. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=228050

Contact Information

Edward P. Lazear (Contact Author)
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-9136 (Phone)
650-723-0498 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
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