Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2282126
 
 

References (47)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Quantifying the Coordinated Effects of Partial Horizontal Acquisitions


Duarte Brito


New University of Lisbon

Ricardo Ribeiro


Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa

Helder Vasconcelos


Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP)

June 19, 2013


Abstract:     
The growth of private-equity investment strategies in which firms often hold partial ownership interests in competing firms has led competition agencies to take an increased interest in assessing the competitive effects of partial horizontal acquisitions. We propose a methodology to evaluate the coordinated effects of such acquisitions on differentiated products industries. The acquisitions may be direct and indirect, and may or not correspond to control. The methodology, that nests full mergers, evaluates the impact on the range of discount factors for which coordination can be sustained. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 63

Keywords: Antitrust, Coordinated Effects, Partial Acquisitions, Oligopoly, Differentiated Products, Demand Estimation

JEL Classification: D12, C54, L13, L41, L66

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Date posted: June 21, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Brito, Duarte and Ribeiro, Ricardo and Vasconcelos, Helder, Quantifying the Coordinated Effects of Partial Horizontal Acquisitions (June 19, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2282126 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2282126

Contact Information

Duarte Brito
New University of Lisbon ( email )
1099-085 Lisboa, 1099-085
Portugal
Ricardo Ribeiro (Contact Author)
Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa ( email )
Rua Diogo Botelho, 1327
Porto, 4169-005
Portugal
+35122 619-6200 (Phone)
+35122-619-6291 (Fax)
Helder Vasconcelos
Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP) ( email )
Rua Dr. Roberto Frias
s/n
4200-464 Porto, 4200-464
Portugal
HOME PAGE: http://www.fep.up.pt/docentes/hvasconcelos
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