Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters
Robert H. Sitkoff
Harvard Law School
Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 02-7
Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 02-4
This article explores the policy bases for, and the political economy of, the law's long-standing discrimination against corporate political speech. This Article also explores the relevance of state law regulation of corporate political speech to the competition between the states for corporate charters. In the process, implications for the current political debate over soft money and the current academic debates over enacting an optional federal corporate takeover law regime and creating a securities law regulatory competition are noted. The underlying aim of this Article is to bring to bear on the relevant policy debates a shift in focus from the shareholder/manager agency relationship to the agency relationship between lawmakers and society. The Article draws on the contractarian view of the firm, the economic theory of regulation, and the study of public choice.
Note: Former title: Corporate Political Speech and the Competition for Corporate Charters
Number of Pages in PDF File: 64
Keywords: Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, Economic Theory of Regulation, Tillman Act, Delaware, Corporate Governance, Regulatory Competition, Managers, Shareholders, Takeovers, Agency Costs
JEL Classification: K22, H11, K22, G34, M14
Date posted: June 8, 2003 ; Last revised: December 9, 2014
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