Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East

42 Pages Posted: 28 Jun 2013

See all articles by Albert Yoon

Albert Yoon

University of Toronto Faculty of Law

Tom Baker

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

Legal scholars have long debated the efficacy of offer-of-judgment rules in promoting the resolution of civil disputes. Unfortunately, measuring the rules' effect in actual litigation has proven difficult because federal and most state courts adopted a version that has long been in place and is generally regarded as toothless and inconsequential. This Article overcomes this measurement obstacle by studying the recent experience of New Jersey, which in 1994 allowed bilateral pre-trial offers with uncapped attorneys' fees as a cost-shifting measure. Using individual-level data from a large national insurer, we analyze insurance-based suits filed in New Jersey and neighboring states between 1992 and 1997. We find that in the aftermath of the rule revision damage awards did not significantly change, but litigants took systematically less time to resolve their disputes and markedly lowered their attorneys' fees for the insurer. These findings suggest that offer-of-judgment rules, if properly designed, can provide an effective and arguably social welfare-enhancing mechanism for resolving civil disputes.

Suggested Citation

Yoon, Albert and Baker, Tom, Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East (2006). Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 155-196, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2285747

Albert Yoon (Contact Author)

University of Toronto Faculty of Law ( email )

78 and 84 Queen's Park
Toronto, Ontario M5S 2C5
Canada

Tom Baker

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-746-2185 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/thbaker/

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