Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2285976
 


 



Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan


Andrew Beath


World Bank

Fotini Christia


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Ruben Enikolopov


Institute for Political Economy and Governance; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; New Economic School

June 1, 2013

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6510

Abstract:     
Using data from a field experiment in 500 villages, this paper studies how local institutions affect the quality of governance, as measured by aid distribution outcomes. In villages where elected councils exist and manage distributions, aid targeting improves. However, if the distribution is not clearly assigned to either the council or customary leaders, the creation of elected councils increases embezzlement and makes decision-making less inclusive. Requiring that women manage the distribution jointly with customary leaders also increases embezzlement. Thus, while elected councils can improve governance, overlapping mandates between new and existing institutions may result in increased rent-seeking.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: Social Accountability, Governance Indicators, National Governance, Housing & Human Habitats, Peri-Urban Communities

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Date posted: June 27, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Beath, Andrew and Christia, Fotini and Enikolopov, Ruben, Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan (June 1, 2013). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6510. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2285976

Contact Information

Andrew Beath
World Bank ( email )
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Fotini Christia
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )
77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States
Ruben Enikolopov
Institute for Political Economy and Governance ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain
New Economic School ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow, 117418
Russia
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