Anonymity in the Dictator Game Revisited
8 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2013
Date Written: 2012
Abstract
Giving in the dictator game has often been interpreted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. We suspect that giving is determined by subjects’ attempts to appear fair in the eyes of recipients and the experimenter. Therefore, we investigate behavior in the dictator game by using the randomized response technique to increase anonymity. Overall, 290 subjects participated in two experiments. The results demonstrate that the randomized response technique reduces giving to negligible amounts compared to the standard double blind condition. Thus, our results suggest that individuals closely follow egoistic motives in the dictator game when anonymity is convincingly implemented.
Keywords: Other-regarding preferences, Fairness, Dictator game, Experimental game theory, Randomized response technique
JEL Classification: C72, C91, D03
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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