Anonymity in the Dictator Game Revisited

8 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2013

See all articles by Axel Franzen

Axel Franzen

University of Bern - Institute for Sociology

Sonja Pointner

University of Bern - Institute for Sociology

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

Giving in the dictator game has often been interpreted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. We suspect that giving is determined by subjects’ attempts to appear fair in the eyes of recipients and the experimenter. Therefore, we investigate behavior in the dictator game by using the randomized response technique to increase anonymity. Overall, 290 subjects participated in two experiments. The results demonstrate that the randomized response technique reduces giving to negligible amounts compared to the standard double blind condition. Thus, our results suggest that individuals closely follow egoistic motives in the dictator game when anonymity is convincingly implemented.

Keywords: Other-regarding preferences, Fairness, Dictator game, Experimental game theory, Randomized response technique

JEL Classification: C72, C91, D03

Suggested Citation

Franzen, Axel and Pointner, Sonja, Anonymity in the Dictator Game Revisited (2012). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 81, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2287837

Axel Franzen (Contact Author)

University of Bern - Institute for Sociology ( email )

Fabrikstrasse 8
Bern, 3012
Switzerland

Sonja Pointner

University of Bern - Institute for Sociology ( email )

Lerchenweg 36
Bern, 3012
Switzerland

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