Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2288491
 
 

References (29)



 


 



Dynamic Countervailing Power Under Public and Private Monitoring


V. Bhaskar


University College London

June 2013

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9526

Abstract:     
We examine buyer strategic power in the model of dynamic Bertrand-Edgeworth competition. Two sellers with a limited inventory sell to a single buyer, who has a consumption opportunity in each period. The market power of the sellers is offset by the strategic power of the buyer. By not consuming in any period, the buyer can destroy a unit of demand, thereby intensifying future price competition. If transactions are publicly observed, we find that that a strategic buyer can do significantly better than non-strategic buyers; strategic power may also give rise to inefficiencies. However, if an agent only perfectly observes those transactions in which he is directly involved, and imperfectly observes other transactions, the strategic power of the buyer is reduced, and in some cases, may be completely eliminated. This highlights the sharp discontinuity between the equilibrium outcomes between perfect and imperfect monitoring.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, dynamic games, imperfect monitoring, strategic buyer

JEL Classification: D43, D92

working papers series


Date posted: July 2, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Bhaskar, V., Dynamic Countervailing Power Under Public and Private Monitoring (June 2013). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9526. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2288491

Contact Information

V. Bhaskar (Contact Author)
University College London ( email )
Gower Street
London
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN


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References:  29

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