Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2288723
 
 

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Similarity in Bond Covenants


Gus De Franco


Tulane University - A.B. Freeman School of Business

Florin P. Vasvari


London Business School

Dushyantkumar Vyas


University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; University of Toronto at Mississauga

Regina Wittenberg Moerman


University of Southern California

April 14, 2016

Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2288723

Abstract:     
We examine the economic consequences associated with the inclusion of covenants with similar levels of restrictiveness in bond contracts. Using a unique Moody’s dataset on the quality of bond covenants, we develop measures that capture similarity in bond covenant terms by comparing the restrictiveness of a bond’s covenants with the covenant restrictiveness of previously issued peer bonds. Consistent with similarity in covenants reducing bondholders’ contracting and comparability costs, we document that bonds with more similar covenant restrictiveness receive significantly lower yields at issuance. These bonds are also characterized by greater liquidity in the secondary market and are more likely to be held by long-term bond investors, such as insurance companies. Our results highlight the benefits of covenant similarity and suggest that the use of covenants with similar restrictiveness levels brings contracting and comparability cost savings that may be larger than the monitoring benefits provided by covenants with more tailored credit protection.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 67

Keywords: Covenants, Covenant Restrictiveness, Comparability, Similarity, Bond Yields

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G32, M49


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Date posted: July 4, 2013 ; Last revised: July 2, 2016

Suggested Citation

De Franco, Gus and Vasvari, Florin P. and Vyas, Dushyantkumar and Wittenberg Moerman, Regina, Similarity in Bond Covenants (April 14, 2016). Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2288723. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2288723 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2288723

Contact Information

Gus De Franco
Tulane University - A.B. Freeman School of Business ( email )
7 McAlister Drive
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States
Florin P. Vasvari
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
Dushyantkumar Vyas
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )
105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6
Canada

University of Toronto at Mississauga ( email )
3359 Mississauga Rd N.
Mississauga, Ontario L5L 1C6
Canada
Regina Wittenberg Moerman (Contact Author)
University of Southern California ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
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