Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs
New York University School of Law
July 5, 2013
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 13-45
The aims of this essay are, first, to present the jurisprudential position that Ronald Dworkin set out in his penultimate book, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011); and, secondly, to elaborate it a little further than Dworkin himself was able to. The position is a distinctive and interesting one. Although Professor Dworkin argued in all his earlier work that moral facts (about rights and justice) were among the truth conditions of legal propositions, now in Justice for Hedgehogs he argued that law is itself a branch of morality. This is a bolder and more radical claim and it requires some quite careful exposition to see how it might be made plausible.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32
Keywords: Dworkin, law, legislation, morality, natural law, positivism, Raz, separation thesisworking papers series
Date posted: July 6, 2013 ; Last revised: July 24, 2013
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.344 seconds