Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2290373
 
 

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Efficiency in General Agency Models with Imperfect Public Monitoring


Anqi Li


Washington University in Saint Louis

December 1, 2014


Abstract:     
In this paper I examine a T-period agency relationship between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent where signals can depend on past actions and exhibit serial correlation. In this general environment, I show that near-efficiency obtains when T is large if the monitoring technology satisfies two basic properties: concentration of measure and informativeness. The tension between these properties determines the boundary at which asymptotic efficiency obtains in agency models with frequent actions, unifies and extends various efficiency results in the agency literature, quantifies the value of knowing detailed features of signal processes and solves a large class of incentive problems with highly persistent monitoring technologies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: dynamic agency; efficiency; robust incentives

JEL Classification: D86

working papers series





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Date posted: July 6, 2013 ; Last revised: January 20, 2015

Suggested Citation

Li, Anqi, Efficiency in General Agency Models with Imperfect Public Monitoring (December 1, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2290373 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2290373

Contact Information

Anqi Li (Contact Author)
Washington University in Saint Louis ( email )
Department of Economics
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States
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