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Efficiency in General Agency Models with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Anqi Li

Washington University in Saint Louis

October 2014

In T-period agency models with imperfect public monitoring where signals can depend arbitrarily on past actions and exhibit serial correlation, I identify two basic properties of the signal processes, the concentration of measure and the informativeness, that help implement near-efficient outcomes when T is large. I also show that these properties are almost necessary for attaining asymptotic near-efficiency in a class of agency models with frequent actions. To prove these results, I construct test contracts which attain robust performances for each T even if details of the signal processes are not exactly known to the principal.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: dynamic agency; robust incentives

JEL Classification: D86

working papers series

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Date posted: July 6, 2013 ; Last revised: October 19, 2014

Suggested Citation

Li, Anqi, Efficiency in General Agency Models with Imperfect Public Monitoring (October 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2290373 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2290373

Contact Information

Anqi Li (Contact Author)
Washington University in Saint Louis ( email )
Department of Economics
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States
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References:  23
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