Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2292410
 
 

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Cartel Formation through Strategic Information Leakage in a Distribution Channel


Noam Shamir


Tel-Aviv University

July 11, 2013


Abstract:     
This paper studies the ability of competing retailers to form a cartel by sharing information with their mutual manufacturer. In a market characterized by demand uncertainty, colluding retailers desire to share information about the potential market demand in order to coordinate on the optimal collusive retail price. However, since direct information-sharing between competing …firms is considered to be a possible signal for collusion, according to the antitrust laws, the retailers search for a mechanism to exchange information in a manner that would not raise the suspicions of the antitrust authorities. This paper examines such a mechanism: each retailer shares his private information with the mutual manufacturer and uses the wholesale price to infer the market condition and coordinate on the cartel price. Although a cartel at the retail level limits the manufacturer’'s sold quantity, under certain conditions, the manufacturer is better-off accepting the retailers' ’private information, thereby facilitating the cartel formation. Moreover, a situation in which the retailers cannot collude by sharing information horizontally and they collude by sharing information with the manufacturer can result in a lower consumer surplus.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

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Date posted: July 11, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Shamir, Noam, Cartel Formation through Strategic Information Leakage in a Distribution Channel (July 11, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2292410 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2292410

Contact Information

Noam Shamir (Contact Author)
Tel-Aviv University ( email )
P.O. Box 39010
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
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