Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State

34 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2013 Last revised: 8 Jan 2023

See all articles by David K. Levine

David K. Levine

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics

Salvatore Modica

Universita di Palermo

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Date Written: July 2013

Abstract

In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently "extractive" in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.

Suggested Citation

Levine, David K. and Levine, David K. and Modica, Salvatore, Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State (July 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19221, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2292841

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Salvatore Modica

Universita di Palermo ( email )

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