Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
34 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2013 Last revised: 8 Jan 2023
There are 2 versions of this paper
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
FRB of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2013-023A
Number of pages: 33
Posted: 10 Jul 2013
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Date Written: July 2013
Abstract
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently "extractive" in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Levine, David K. and Levine, David K. and Modica, Salvatore, Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State (July 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19221, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2292841
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