Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2293164
 
 

References (31)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Fake It Till You Make It: Reputation, Competition, and Yelp Review Fraud


Michael Luca


Harvard Business School - Negotiations, Organizations & Markets Unit

Georgios Zervas


Boston University School of Management, Marketing Department

November 8, 2013

Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 14-006

Abstract:     
Consumer reviews are now a part of everyday decision-making. Yet the credibility of reviews is fundamentally undermined when business-owners commit review fraud, either by leaving positive reviews for themselves or negative reviews for their competitors. In this paper, we investigate the extent and patterns of review fraud on the popular consumer review platform Yelp.com. Because one cannot directly observe which reviews are fake, we focus on reviews that Yelp's algorithmic indicator has identified as fraudulent. Using this proxy, we present four main findings. First, roughly 16 percent of restaurant reviews on Yelp are identified as fraudulent, and tend to be more extreme (favorable or unfavorable) than other reviews. Second, a restaurant is more likely to commit review fraud when its reputation is weak, i.e., when it has few reviews, or it has recently received bad reviews. Third, chain restaurants -- which benefit less from Yelp -- are also less likely to commit review fraud. Fourth, when restaurants face increased competition, they become more likely to leave unfavorable reviews for competitors. Taken in aggregate, these findings highlight the extent of review fraud and suggest that a business's decision to commit review fraud responds to competition and reputation incentives rather than simply the restaurant's ethics.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: July 13, 2013 ; Last revised: August 5, 2014

Suggested Citation

Luca, Michael and Zervas, Georgios, Fake It Till You Make It: Reputation, Competition, and Yelp Review Fraud (November 8, 2013). Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 14-006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2293164 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2293164

Contact Information

Michael Luca (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School - Negotiations, Organizations & Markets Unit ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Boston, MA 02163
United States
HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=602417
Georgios Zervas
Boston University School of Management, Marketing Department ( email )
United States
HOME PAGE: http://people.bu.edu/zg
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 11,332
Downloads: 1,276
Download Rank: 7,687
References:  31
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.313 seconds