The Market, the Firm, and Behavioral Antitrust

Oxford Handbook on Behavioral Economics and the Law (2013), Forthcoming

Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 1447

31 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2013 Last revised: 23 Aug 2013

Date Written: June 23, 2013

Abstract

This chapter examines the main distinct concerns facing the application of empirical behavioral evidence to antitrust law and economics — also known as "behavioral antitrust." More than many (though not all) other legal fields, antitrust law is primarily concerned with the conduct of firms in markets rather than in individual behavior per se. Yet much of the empirical evidence that behavioral antitrust draws on concerns individual behavior outside the firm, often in non-market settings. Hence besides adducing additional, direct empirical evidence on behavioral phenomena within firms and markets, there is a need to determine when and how the behavioral evidence on human judgment and decision behavior more generally is informative for antitrust. To this end, the chapter considers the ways in which markets and firms shape behavior. Direct evidence and theoretical analysis both reveal these institutions variously to facilitate rationality and deviations from it. After illustrating the implications of the complex interaction among markets, firms, and the rationality of antitrust actors across different areas of the law and enforcement policy, the chapter concludes by sketching some important open questions and future research directions in behavioral antitrust.

Keywords: law and economics, behavioral antitrust, markets

Suggested Citation

Tor, Avishalom, The Market, the Firm, and Behavioral Antitrust (June 23, 2013). Oxford Handbook on Behavioral Economics and the Law (2013), Forthcoming, Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 1447, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2293733 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2293733

Avishalom Tor (Contact Author)

Notre Dame Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 780
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0780
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
389
Abstract Views
2,276
Rank
139,529
PlumX Metrics