Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Role of Reputation
Australian National University (ANU) - Crawford School of Public Policy; University of Oxford - Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
National Bank of Belgium - Department of Financial Stability; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
This paper focuses on bank rescue packages and on the behaviour of troubled banks in light of rescue offers. A puzzling feature of experience with banking crises is that in many cases policy authorities make offers of bank rescue, and banks are reluctant to accept these offers. We study situations in which regulators have decided to offer bank rescue plans, and we show that a combination of factors, including bankers' reputational concerns, can explain banks' potential reluctance to accept offers of recapitalization.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 49
JEL Classification: G21, G28
Date posted: July 17, 2000
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