The Structure And Conduct Of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby The Federal Communications Commission
John M. De Figueiredo
Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Emerson H. Tiller
Northwestern University - School of Law
This paper examines the amount and organization of lobbying (internal organization vs. trade association) by firms in administrative agencies. It explores the power and limitations of the collective action theories and transaction cost theories in explaining lobbying. It introduces a dataset of over 900 lobbying contacts covering 101 issues at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in early 1998. We find that the structure and conduct of large firm lobbying at the FCC is consistent with the predictions of transaction costs theories and the main results of collective action theories. However, large firms do not change their behavior drastically as structures arise to remedy the free rider problem. Small firms show no sensitivity to collective action issues or transaction cost issues in the organization or amount of their lobbying, but they do lobby less when having to reveal proprietary information. In sum, large firms behave largely consistent with theoretical predictions, while small firms do not.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 51
JEL Classification: K2, L5working papers series
Date posted: June 23, 2000
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