Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=229517
 
 

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Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function


Ronald J. Gilson


Stanford Law School; Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

May 2000

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 192; and Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 174

Abstract:     
This paper examines the interplay between selection-driven functional adaptivity on the one hand, and formal institutional persistence or path dependency on the other, that will determine whether such corporate governance convergence as we observe will be formal or functional. Five combinations of formal and functional covergence are considered: 1) purely functional convergence, as with the displacement of inefficient management; 2) the use of formal tools to catalyze the breakdown of formal barriers to functional convergence as with the elimination of tax on the sale of cross holdings; 3) the need for elements of both formal and functional convergence as with the creation of the institutional infrastructure that supports a venture capital market; 4) convergence by contract as with security design or foreign stock exchange listing; and 5) convergence through regulatory competition -- the hybrid of private and public ordering introduced to the European Community by the European Court of Justice's recent decision in Centros.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

JEL Classification: G2, G3, K0, K3

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Date posted: July 12, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Gilson, Ronald J., Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function (May 2000). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 192; and Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 174. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=229517 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.229517

Contact Information

Ronald J. Gilson (Contact Author)
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-723-0614 (Phone)
650-725-0253 (Fax)
Columbia Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
212-854-1655 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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